e., imitation is relatively merrick backcountry wet cat food cheaper vis a vis Cournot), most firms use this heuristic and the Cournot equilibrium is stabilized for market sizes for which it was unstable under Cournot homogeneous learning.However, as the number of firms increases
Imitation Dynamics in Oligopoly Games with Heterogeneous Players
We investigate the role and performance of imitative behavior in a class of quantity-setting, Cournot games.Within a framework of evolutionary competition between rational, myopic best-response and imitation heuristics with differential heuristics’ costs, we found that the equilibrium stability depends on the sign of the cost differential between the unstable a&d ej-123 heuristic (Cournot best-response) and the stable one (imitation) and on the intensity of the evolutionary pressure.When this cost differential is positive (i.
e., imitation is relatively merrick backcountry wet cat food cheaper vis a vis Cournot), most firms use this heuristic and the Cournot equilibrium is stabilized for market sizes for which it was unstable under Cournot homogeneous learning.However, as the number of firms increases
e., imitation is relatively merrick backcountry wet cat food cheaper vis a vis Cournot), most firms use this heuristic and the Cournot equilibrium is stabilized for market sizes for which it was unstable under Cournot homogeneous learning.However, as the number of firms increases